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FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF DISABILITY: A 
GENEALOGICAL INTERVENTION
Shelley l. Tremain
abSTracT: This article is a feminist intervention into the ways that disability is 
researched and represented in philosophy at present. Nevertheless, some of the 
claims that I make over the course of the article are also pertinent to the margin-
alization in philosophy of other areas of inquiry, including philosophy of race, 
feminist philosophy more broadly, indigenous philosophies, and LGBTQI philoso-
phy. Although the discipline of philosophy largely continues to operate under the 
guise of neutrality, rationality, and objectivity, the institutionalized structure of the 
discipline implicitly and explicitly promotes certain ontologies, epistemologies, and 
methodologies as bona fide philosophy, while casting the ontologies, epistemolo-
gies, and methodologies of marginalized philosophies as mere simulacra of alleg-
edly fundamental ways of knowing and doing philosophy and thus rendering these 
marginalized philosophies more or less expendable. This article is designed to 
show that legitimized philosophical discourses are vital mechanisms in the prob-
lematization of disability.
1. INTRODUCTION
This article is a feminist intervention into the ways that disability is 
researched and represented in philosophy at present, a feminist intervention 
distinctly designed to subvert the dominance of individualized and medical-
ized approaches to disability and the marginalization of critical philosophi-
cal work on disability. Nevertheless, some of the claims that I make over the 
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course of the article are also pertinent to the marginalization in philosophy 
of other areas of inquiry, including philosophy of race, feminist philoso-
phy more broadly, indigenous philosophies, and LGBTQI philosophy. For 
although the discipline of philosophy largely continues to operate under the 
guise of neutrality, rationality, and objectivity, the institutionalized structure 
of the discipline implicitly and explicitly promotes certain ontologies, epis-
temologies, and methodologies as bona fide philosophy, while casting the 
ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies of marginalized philosophies 
as mere simulacra of allegedly fundamental ways of knowing and doing 
philosophy and thus rendering these marginalized philosophies more or less 
expendable.
A certain limited number of subfields of philosophy—metaphysics, ethics, 
logic, epistemology, and philosophy of language—are widely regarded in the 
contemporary discipline of philosophy as foundational to it, uniquely distin-
guishing it from other disciplines of research and teaching and reaffirming its 
self-ascribed status as “the queen of the sciences.” Philosophers who continue 
to hold this conventional view of philosophy maintain that these subfields are 
the necessary, unchanging, and “core” elements of philosophy, while other 
subfields of philosophical inquiry—such as philosophy of race and feminist 
philosophy—are applications and contingent derivatives of these foundational 
subfields. That is, philosophers who understand the structure and practice of 
philosophy in this conventional way take for granted that the former subfields 
are ontologically and epistemologically prior to the latter subfields and, indeed, 
render the latter subfields conceivable in the first place. For philosophers who 
distinguish in this way between “core” subfields of philosophy and “applied” 
subfields of philosophy, the questions and concerns that make up the former 
subfields are generally regarded as timeless, disinterested, and universal in 
character, and, alternatively, the questions and concerns that constitute the 
latter subfields are generally taken to be accidental, interested, and partial.
This conventional understanding of philosophy conditions PhilPapers: 
Online Research in Philosophy (n.d.), the increasingly influential database 
of research and writing in philosophy whose architecture is nevertheless 
purported to be value neutral and merely descriptive of philosophy’s authen-
tic nature. The content of the database is organized into predetermined 
areas of specialization, subfields, and topics in philosophy that are hierar-
chically arranged in descending order of importance according to prevailing 
ideas in the tradition and discipline of Euro-American, Western philosophy 
about which areas, subfields, and topics: (1) have the most/less philosophi-
cal import; (2) have the most/less explanatory power; and (3) should be 
endowed with the most/less authoritative status. So-called core or 
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fundamental areas of the discipline—“Metaphysics and Epistemology,” 
“Value Theory,” “Science, Logic, and Mathematics,” “History of Western 
Philosophy,” and “Philosophical Traditions”—are designated as the 
supreme categories on the database and, in turn, other areas of inquiry are 
designated as subcategories of these supreme categories, or subcategories of 
the subcategories of the supreme categories, or (“leaf”) subcategories of the 
subcategories of the subcategories of the supreme categories, where a cate-
gory’s distance from the supreme categories is understood to be indicative 
of the allegedly diminished import and explanatory power that it holds, as 
well as the relative authority within philosophy of the areas of inquiry that 
it comprises (Tremain 2013, 2017a, xi–ix).1
Against this conventional and biased understanding of the institutional 
structure and discursive practices of philosophy, I want to argue that the 
classification of subfields in philosophy, the relations between the classifica-
tions of the subfields, and the questions and concerns that these subfields 
comprise is no mere value-neutral reportage or representation of objective 
differences, relations, and similarities that await discovery and recognition; 
rather, classification (and classification systems) in philosophy (as elsewhere) 
is performative insofar as it contributes to the constitution of the very val-
ue-laden resemblances, distinctions, associations, and relationships between 
phenomena and states of affairs that it puts into place. Although many 
philosophers continue to represent philosophy as a value neutral, detached, 
disinterested, and impartial enterprise, political, social, economic, cultural, 
and institutional force relations influence every aspect of the discipline (and 
profession) of philosophy. Every philosophical question and concern, as well 
as every subfield that these questions and concerns constitute, is a politically 
potent artifact of historically contingent and culturally specific discourse. As 
contingent artifacts of discourse, furthermore, every philosophical question, 
every philosophical subfield, and every specialization in philosophy has 
a history, a history that can be traced genealogically (see Tremain 2013, 
2017a, ix–xi).
Consider the marginalized location that the emerging subfield of femi-
nist philosophy of disability occupies at present within the current formu-
lation of the PhilPapers database. Within the constitutive categories of the 
database, that is, feminist philosophical work on disability is situated under 
the rubric of a “leaf” subcategory—namely, “Feminism: Disability”—that 
1 Some of my remarks in this article, including my remarks about the PhilPapers data-
base, have been reproduced or adapted from my book Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of 
Disability (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017) and are reprinted with permission 
from the University of Michigan Press.
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is subordinate to the subcategory of “Topics in Feminist Philosophy,” a 
subcategory of the superior category of “Philosophy of Gender, Race, 
and Sexuality” that is, in turn, a subcategory of the supreme category of 
“Value Theory.” In the schema of the PhilPapers database, in other words, 
feminist philosophy of disability is represented as on par with “topics” in 
feminist philosophy such as “Autonomy,” “Love,” “Identity Politics,” and 
“Reproduction,” rather than represented as on par with, an element of, 
and in relationship with other apparatuses of identity and subjection—
namely, gender, race, and sexuality—in a more comprehensive category 
of “Philosophy of Gender, Race, Sexuality, and Disability,” to which the 
subcategory of “Topics in Feminist Philosophy” would in turn be subordi-
nate. Although the superior category of “Philosophy of Gender, Race, and 
Sexuality” includes subcategories of “Philosophy of Gender,” “Philosophy 
of Race,” and “Philosophy of Sexuality,” it does not encompass an off-
spring category of “Philosophy of Disability.” There is, of course, no objec-
tive and value-neutral explanation for why feminist philosophy of disability 
has been so categorized in the PhilPapers database. Rather, the relegated 
status conferred upon feminist philosophy of disability in the database 
reflects a political decision, a political decision that, among other things, 
precludes and even prevents the incorporation of disability into intersec-
tional or other integrated analyses, thereby reinforcing depoliticized con-
ceptions of disability in philosophy and contributing to the marginalization 
and diminution of critical work on disability within the subfield of feminist 
philosophy and the discipline more generally (see Tremain 2013, 2017a, 
ix–xi).
The motivation to attribute this relegated status to feminist philosoph-
ical work on disability becomes even more discernible when one consid-
ers how disability is classified elsewhere in the database. For example, 
“leaf” sub-sub-sub-categories with respect to disability can be found under 
the broader sub-sub-category of “Biomedical Ethics,” alongside and on 
par with items such as “Drugs,” “Death and Dying,” and “Neuroethics,” 
as well as under the sub-sub-category of “Social Ethics,” alongside and 
on par with items such as “Deception” and “Friendship.” These “leaf” 
sub-sub-sub-categories of “Disability” are, ultimately, derivatives of the 
superior (sub-)sub-category of “Applied Ethics,” itself a subcategory of the 
supreme category of “Value Theory.” I want to point out, therefore, that 
the company that the (“leaf” sub-sub-)sub-category of “Disability” keeps in 
the former location on the database—“Biomedical Ethics”—both reinforces 
individualized and medicalized conceptions of disability and minimizes the 
social, political, and discursive significance of disability, especially in light of 
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how subordinate the positioning of “Disability” is within the database as a 
whole. I want to point out, furthermore, that the almost exclusive classifica-
tion and categorization of work on disability under the database’s category 
of “Value Theory” relies on reductive assumptions according to which the 
only worthwhile inquiries about disability in which philosophers engage are 
“ethical” in nature, effectively obscuring the fact that much of the work 
done in philosophy of disability concentrates on epistemological and meta-
physical questions about the phenomena  (see, e.g., Tremain 2013, 2017a; 
also see Tremain 2015).
The genealogy of feminist philosophy of disability that I have begun to 
unravel in this article (and unravelled in the 2017 book from which this 
article is adapted) aims to resist and disrupt the conventional—that is, indi-
vidualized and medicalized—understanding of disability that most philos-
ophers presuppose, drawing upon Michel Foucault’s toolbox of insights to 
do so. Although mainstream philosophers variously allege that their claims 
about disability are value neutral and disinterested, a feminist philosophy 
of disability that draws on Foucault openly acknowledges the political 
character of both its claims with respect to disability and the presupposi-
tions on which they rely, arguing (with Foucault) that discursive practices 
are always already the products of historically contingent and situated 
force relations.
A politically engaged and informed philosophy of disability that uses 
Foucault’s insights will be unpopular in some corners of philosophy. For 
while Foucauldian insights have made significant inroads elsewhere in the 
humanities and social sciences, they remain starkly marginalized within 
philosophy, a state of affairs that can be attributed to a variety of fac-
tors, including the continued dominance of the methods and approaches 
of “analytic” philosophy; the persistent disdain amongst mainstream (ana-
lytic) philosophers for “postmodernism” and relativism, both of which 
many philosophers disparagingly affiliate with Foucault; the narrow(ing) 
concentration of the prevailing subject matter and techniques of philoso-
phy; the increasingly close association between science and philosophy; and 
the otherwise limited theoretical, discursive, and political scope of much of 
the research that philosophers currently produce. In Foucault and Feminist 
Philosophy of Disability (2017a), I directly address these issues at length; thus, 
I largely bypass them in this article. My argument in what follows is nev-
ertheless designed to show that Foucault’s body of work offers the most 
sophisticated and politically astute tools with which to articulate a feminist 
philosophy of disability that takes account of its own historical and cultural 
specificity and contingency.
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2. GENEALOGY, PROBLEMATIZATION, AND DISABILITY
Introduced by Friedrich Nietzsche in A Genealogy of Morals ([1887] 1999) and 
adapted by Foucault in works such as Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison (1977a) and A History of Sexuality, Volume One: An Introduction (1978), gene-
alogy is a historicized approach to philosophical inquiry, distinct from the 
ahistorical conceptual analysis, deductive reasoning, and logical argumen-
tation that characterizes mainstream analytic philosophy. Foucault adopted 
genealogy to critically inquire into the history of necessity on a given topic 
and the historical emergence of the necessary conditions for states of affairs, 
underscoring the importance to such an approach of contingency and of 
questioning what has been taken for granted as self-evident. Foucault’s gene-
alogies—which he variously referred to as “histories of the present” and 
“historical ontologies of ourselves”—are concerned with questions about the 
conditions of possibility for who we are now, that is, questions about how 
our current ways of thinking and acting came into being (Foucault 1997).
The genealogist does not reject knowledge or appeal to, or even cel-
ebrate, some immediate experience that knowledge has yet to capture. 
Rather, genealogies, Foucault (1980b) explained, “are about the insurrec-
tion of knowledges....An insurrection against the centralizing power effects 
that are bound up with the institutionalization and workings of any scientific 
discourse organized in a society such as ours.” Genealogy, Foucault wrote, 
is an “attempt to desubjugate historical knowledges...to enable them to 
oppose and struggle against the coercion of a unitary, formal, and scientific 
theoretical discourse” (2003b, 9). He argued, furthermore, that criticism 
performs its work by uncovering and restoring these subjugated, unquali-
fied, and even directly disqualified knowledges. Genealogies exhume these 
subjugated knowledges, exhume these obsolete and even archaic discourses, 
events, and institutional practices, in order that we can understand the his-
torically contingent character of the self-understandings and self-perceptions 
that we hold in the present.
Foucault’s genealogies were inquiries into the “problematization” of phe-
nomena—including abnormality, perversion, sexuality, and madness—in 
the present, inquiries that attempted to uncover how “solutions” to cer-
tain problems have been constructed, in addition to how these different 
solutions resulted from the problematization of that given state of affairs 
in the first place (2003a, 20–24). Just as Foucault’s genealogical studies of 
the problematization of abnormality, perversion, sexuality, and madness 
(among other things) were not positivistic appeals to a form of science 
that more accurately represents these phenomena, nor were these studies 
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intended to provide normative responses or solutions to these phenomena. 
Rather, Foucault’s genealogical studies were designed to show how certain 
phenomena and states of affairs became thinkable, that is, emerged as prob-
lems to which solutions came to be sought. Foucault, in response to phi-
losophers who have argued that his nonnormative, genealogical approach 
of inquiry cannot distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable forms 
of power (e.g., Fraser 1989, 31), explained the approach in this way: “In a 
sense, I am a moralist, insofar as I believe that one of the tasks, one of the 
meanings of human existence—the source of human freedom—is never to 
accept anything as definitive, untouchable, obvious, or immobile” (Foucault 
1988, 1). Foucault’s historical method of critical inquiry requires that we ask 
about the values, purposes, and aims of our current practices, the circum-
stances of their emergence, and the historically contingent forms of power 
that contribute to their constitution (also see Hall 2015, 2016).
My feminist philosophical work on disability—which, in some respects, 
extends Foucault’s own genealogical examinations of the problematization 
of abnormality, madness, perversion, and other phenomena commonly 
associated with disability—is thus most aptly characterized as a feminist 
genealogical inquiry into the problematization of disability in philosophy 
(see, e.g., Tremain 2006; 2010; 2015; 2017a). For just as Foucault’s genea-
logical studies of the problematization of abnormality, perversion, sexuality, 
and madness (among other things) were not intended to provide normative 
responses or solutions to these phenomena, my problematization of dis-
ability does not offer an explicitly normative feminist proposal or response 
to the phenomena of disability. Such a given proposal or response would 
presuppose that there is a certain definitive solution to the “problem” of 
disability. Instead, my feminist philosophical inquiry into the problemati-
zation of disability is designed in large part to indicate how a certain his-
torically and culturally specific regime of power—namely, biopower—has 
produced certain acts, practices, subjectivities, bodies, relations, and so on 
as a problem for the present, as well as to indicate the role that philosophy 
has played and continues to play in the elaboration of this problem. In 
other words, my aim is to articulate an analytically robust and empirically 
grounded feminist philosophy of disability that interrogates the historical 
conditions of possibility for its own articulation.
Due to the resurgence of work on social justice that the publication of 
John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) precipitated, as well as to the emer-
gence and expansion of the subfields of bioethics and cognitive science, 
discussions about disability have become increasingly prevalent in main-
stream philosophy. Since the mid-twentieth century, that is, mainstream 
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philosophers have engaged in philosophical discussions about disability for-
mulated around questions such as these: What (if anything) does society 
owe to disabled people? How should society compensate disabled people 
for their natural disadvantages and brute bad luck? On what grounds is it 
justifiable to euthanize disabled people? Is it morally permissible to conduct 
experiments on cognitively disabled research subjects? What can we learn 
about the (normal) mind from the fact that “people with autism” lack a 
theory of mind? What can we learn about the operations of the (normal) 
brain, its emotions, perceptions, and so on, from study of people who have 
experienced brain injuries?
Notwithstanding the apparent variety of questions that mainstream phi-
losophers throughout the discipline have asked about disability, the cluster 
of motivational assumptions that underpins their inquiries takes for granted 
the metaphysical status and epistemological character of the category of 
disability, casting disability as a self-evident designation that science and 
medicine can accurately represent. On the terms of these assumptions, 
disability is a prediscursive, transcultural, and transhistorical disadvantage, 
an objective human defect, that is, a nonaccidental, biological human prop-
erty, attribute, or characteristic that ought to be prevented, corrected, elim-
inated, or cured. For example, Rawls, because he assumed that disability is 
a self-evidently natural defect, that is, because Rawls assumed that disability 
is a prediscursive, biomedical phenomenon, he excluded consideration of 
it from his theory of justice, arguing that “normal and cooperating” mem-
bers of society should choose principles of justice that focus exclusively on 
what he called “the basic structure of society” rather than seek principles of 
justice that encompass “special” medical needs and healthcare concerns. In 
their critical responses to Rawls, Amartya Sen (1979) and Ronald Dworkin 
(1981a, 1981b) also naturalized and medicalized disability, variously argu-
ing that Rawls erred insofar as he deemed the possession or lack of “nat-
ural” characteristics, talents, and capacities to be “morally arbitrary” and 
thus not the appropriate subject matter of a theory of justice. Dworkin, in 
his own theory of equality of resources, therefore proposed a hypothetical 
insurance market that would “compensate for handicaps,” that is, make 
cash payments to “handicapped” people based on their assessments and 
calculations of the opportunity costs that would accrue to them due to 
these “natural” handicaps. In another context, I have pointed out that the 
structure of Dworkin’s insurance market would compel disabled people to 
naturalize the social disadvantages that they confront, effectively violat-
ing his own claims about the constraints that the requirements of self-re-
spect place on a theory of justice (see Tremain 1996). That the deleterious 
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individualizing and medicalizing assumptions that have conditioned work 
on disability and social justice in mainstream political philosophy are con-
testable, that disability might be a historically and culturally specific and 
contingent social phenomenon, a complex apparatus of power, rather than 
a natural attribute or property that certain people possess, has not been 
considered, let alone seriously entertained.
Philosophers who argue that the social inequalities that accrue to dis-
abled people are necessary consequences of a self-evident physiological, 
or natural, human characteristic (property, difference, or attribute) make 
certain assumptions about the relation between biology and society that 
my feminist philosophy of disability is designed to undermine. Dorothy E. 
Roberts (2016) has distinguished heuristically between two approaches to 
the question of the relation between biology and society, approaches that 
she refers to as “the old biosocial science” and “the new biosocial science.” 
As Roberts explains it, the old biosocial science posits that biological dif-
ferences produce social inequality, whereas the new biosocial science posits 
that social inequality produces biological differences. The biological deter-
minism of the old biosocial science, she notes, is achieved in these ways: 
first, the old biosocial science approach separates nature from nurture in 
order to locate the origins of social inequalities in inherent traits rather than 
imposed societal structures; second, the old biosocial science postulates that 
social inequalities are reproduced in the bodies, especially the wombs, of 
socially disadvantaged people rather than reinvented through unjust ideolo-
gies and institutions; third, the old bioscience identifies problems that stem 
from social inequality as derived from the threats that oppressed people’s 
biology itself poses to society, rather than from structural barriers and state 
violence imposed upon oppressed people; and fourth, the old bioscience 
endeavors to intervene and fix perceived biological deficits in the bodies of 
oppressed people rather than end the structural violence that dehumanizes 
them and maintains an unjust social order.
Roberts points out that, by contrast, the new biosocial science posits that 
every single biological element, every single biological process in the human 
body, every human cell, and everything that happens to a human cell is 
affected by society. All of life, Roberts remarks, is at once biological and 
social. There is, in short, no natural body. Genes do not determine any-
thing. Moreover, our brains are plastic, with the ability to be modified by 
social experience. Epigenetics and social neuroscience, Roberts writes, show 
that biology is not a separate entity that interacts with the environment; 
rather, biology is constituted by these interactions (2016; see also Roberts 
1998, 2012; Prinz 2012; Gilman and Thomas 2016). With Roberts, various 
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authors have argued that critical analyses of biosocial science must consider 
how claims about the social construction of biological phenomena are pro-
duced, in what contexts they are mobilized, and for what political purposes 
(e.g., Pitts-Taylor 2010). In my work to articulate a feminist philosophy of 
disability, I aim to critically and genealogically denaturalize and debiologize 
the phenomena of disability in these ways, among others.
3. FEMINIST PHILOSOPHIES OF DISABILITY
Feminist epistemologists and feminist philosophers of science have for quite 
some time argued that philosophical inquiry must take account of infor-
mation about the social contexts from which both philosophical questions 
emerge and responses to them are generated, including the subjectivity and 
social positioning of any given questioner and respondent. For example, 
Sandra Harding has argued that information about the subjectivity and 
social situation of knowers can provide valuable insights into the assump-
tions and biases on which a given position relies (see, e.g., Harding 1986, 
1991, 2015). Harding and other feminist philosophers maintain that any 
given proposition, argument, or other discursive practice is a product of 
the enculturation along gendered, racial, classist, and national lines of the 
subject (or group of subjects) who articulates it and the sociocultural milieu 
from which it emerges. Harding and other feminist philosophers claim, in 
short, that there is no such thing as a view from nowhere. To argue this 
way, Harding and a growing number of feminist (and other) philosophers 
assume some version of “standpoint epistemology.” Feminist standpoint 
epistemologies variously postulate that people in subordinated social posi-
tions have, in virtue of their subordinated social status, understandings of 
social relations that are superior to—that is, more complete and objective 
than—the understandings of these relations that members of privileged 
social groups have (see Harding 1986, 2015; Hartsock 1983; Dotson 2011, 
2012). Alison Wylie points out that standpoint theory is an explicitly polit-
ical social epistemology whose “central and motivating insight is an inver-
sion thesis” (2003, 26). As Wylie explains it,
Those who are subject to structures of domination that systematically margin-
alize and oppress them may, in fact, be epistemically privileged in some crucial 
respects. They may know different things, or know things better than those who 
are comparatively privileged (socially, politically) by virtue of what they expe-
rience and how they understand their experience. Feminist standpoint theorists 
argue that gender is one dimension of social differentiation that may make a 
difference epistemically. Their aim is to both understand how the systematic 
partiality of authoritative knowledge arises—specifically, its androcentrism and 
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sexism—and to account for the constructive contributions made by those work-
ing from marginal standpoints (especially feminist standpoints) in countering this 
partiality. (2003, 26)
Feminist philosophers in professional, institutional, and social positions of 
relative privilege must do more than they have thus far done to put these 
epistemological and methodological claims to work in practice, especially 
with respect to disability (and disabled philosophers); nevertheless, feminist 
philosophical insights about situated knowledges contribute to the back-
ground of my feminist philosophy of disability, especially given the commit-
ment of feminist standpoint theorists who—however much they otherwise 
disagree—concur that standpoint theories must not “presuppose an essen-
tialist definition of the social categories or collectivities in terms of which 
epistemically relevant standpoints are characterized” (Wylie 2003, 26).
As the previous remarks about feminist standpoint epistemologies indi-
cate, feminist philosophers take a critical approach to many of the methods 
and values of traditional areas of philosophy, questioning the assumptions 
and biases on which these areas of philosophy rely and identifying how these 
assumptions and biases reinforce forms of social subordination, especially 
with respect to gender. Feminist philosophers of disability (e.g., Silvers 1995; 
Wendell 1996; Kittay 1999; Carlson 2009; Barnes 2016) variously concen-
trate on disability, as well as on assumptions and biases about disability 
on which philosophical claims rely, examining how these assumptions and 
biases contribute to the social subordination of disabled people. Feminist 
philosophers of disability also advance approaches to disability that resist 
and run counter to the conception of disability that prevails in mainstream 
bioethics, cognitive science, and mainstream political philosophy and ethics, 
a conception according to which disability is a deficit, personal misfortune, 
or pathology that necessarily reduces the quality and worth of disabled 
people’s lives and inevitably leads to the social and economic disadvantages 
that disabled people confront. Insofar as mainstream philosophers such as 
Rawls have cast disability as a natural, negative, and inert state of affairs 
in this way, they have largely removed the category of disability from the 
realm of philosophical inquiry and kept at bay philosophical debate and 
questioning about its epistemological, ethical, and political status. Feminist 
philosophers of disability, by contrast, both use and take a critical stance 
toward the history of philosophy and the contemporary practice of main-
stream philosophy to variously elaborate new ways in which to think about 
disability and about the current social, political, cultural, and economic 
position of disabled people. They do so by employing the very methods, 
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concepts, analytical rigor, and argumentative tools of the Euro-American, 
Western philosophical tradition and the discipline of philosophy in which 
they were trained, in addition to critically evaluating these practices and 
tools through the concepts, political commitments, critical insights, and 
personal investments that shape feminist, anti-ableist, antiracist, class-con-
scious, and antiheterosexist theory and practice.
My feminist philosophy of disability relies upon an understanding of dis-
ability that distinguishes it from other feminist philosophies and theories of 
disability. Other feminist philosophies and theories of disability uncritically 
retain some of the unsavory elements of dominant theoretical approaches to 
disability insofar as they variously conceive disability as (1) the functional man-
ifestation of an intrinsic characteristic, a biological difference, or a property 
(attribute)—for example, an impairment—that certain people embody or pos-
sess and that gives rise to certain forms of social discrimination against them 
(e.g., Barnes 2016); or (2) the form of discrimination and oppression imposed 
upon people who have an intrinsic characteristic, attribute, or property con-
strued as a human difference (e.g., Silvers 1995; Wendell 1996; Kittay 1999); 
or (3) some combination of (1) and (2), in which the relation between disability 
(as a functional limitation or form of social oppression) and, say, impairment 
(as an intrinsic characteristic, a property, or a difference that some people 
embody or possess) may not be clearly defined or may fluctuate from one con-
text to another context, though, terminologically speaking, emphasis is placed 
upon the former, that is, disability (e.g., Carlson 2009). Feminist philosophies 
and theories that assume (1) construe disability as a natural feature of human 
existence, an aspect of human diversity that has historically been devalued 
and must be redeemed, revalued, and even celebrated. Feminist philosophies 
and theories of disability that assume (2) construe disability as a social, eco-
nomic, and political problem directed at an already-existing group of people. 
Whereas feminist philosophies and theories of disability that assume (3) tend 
to be ambiguous about the actual character of disability and are, in some 
cases, inadvertently self-contradictory (see Tremain 2017a).
I want to point out, furthermore, that although these apparently distinct 
conceptions of disability diverge from each other in some identifiable ways, 
they depend upon roughly the same assumptions about the epistemological 
and ontological status of impairment and disability, as well as upon the 
same assumptions about social power, including the assumption according 
to which power is fundamentally repressive and external to preexisting 
objects upon which it acts. I disagree with all these assumptions. Instead, I 
maintain, with Foucault, that social power is productive of the objects that it 
affects rather than first and foremost repressive; that is, power is immanent 
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in the objects and practices it affects rather than external to them, as these 
other (feminist) conceptions of disability assume. In other words, my dis-
agreement with these other feminist conceptions of disability stems from the 
assumptions about causation that they make and the epistemological and 
ontological status that they implicitly confer upon the categories of impair-
ment and disability. Whereas other feminist philosophers and theorists of 
disability variously conceive of disability as the functional outcome of a 
natural human characteristic, a human variation or difference, an identity, 
or a form of oppression in relation to which impairment is assumed to 
be the anterior, or prediscursive, foundation, I regard disability as what 
Foucault (1980a) referred to as an “apparatus” (dispositif) of relatively recent 
force relations. Impairment, I contend, is an element of this apparatus pro-
duced as its naturalized and naturalizing foundation; that is, impairment 
is both an effect of and a mechanism of the apparatus of disability (see 
Tremain 2017a).
A disabled feminist interlocutor might object that my claims according to 
which (1) disability is an apparatus of power and (2) impairment is produced 
as the naturalized foundation of this apparatus (3) deny the materiality of 
the impaired body. That is, a disabled feminist interlocutor might believe 
that a charge that disabled feminists (among others) have directed at the 
British social model of disability (BSM)—namely, that the BSM denies 
impairment and the body—should also be directed at the claims according 
to which disability is an apparatus of power and impairment is its natural-
ized foundation. In other contexts, I identify numerous important differ-
ences between, on the one side, the conception of impairment and disability 
that the BSM assumes and, on the other, the conception of disability as 
an apparatus, in Foucault’s sense, differences that the hypothetical charge 
collapses. As I point out in these other contexts, furthermore, the objec-
tion misconstrues Foucault’s arguments about the discursive constitution 
of the body. For Foucault did not deny the materiality of the body and its 
experiences; rather, Foucault was concerned to show that “the body” and 
its material experiences cannot be dissociated from the historically contin-
gent practices that bring it into being, that is, bring it into being as that 
kind of thing: as impaired, as racialized, gendered, sexed, and so on (see 
Tremain 2001; 2015; 2010; 2015; 2017a). Foucault explained his genealog-
ical approach to the body in this way:
We believe that feelings are immutable, but every sentiment, particularly the 
noblest and most disinterested, has a history. We believe in the dull constancy 
of instinctual life and imagine that it continues to exert its force indiscriminately 
in the present as it did in the past. . . . We believe, in any event, that the body 
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obeys the exclusive laws of physiology and that it escapes the inf luence of history, 
but this too is false. (1977b, 153)
4. THE APPARATUS OF DISABILITY
Given the persistence of charges according to which Foucauldian approaches 
to disability replicate problems of the BSM, a fuller explanation of the idea 
of disability an apparatus seems apropos. In “The Confession of the Flesh,” 
Foucault (1980a, 194) defined an apparatus (dispositif ) as a heterogeneous 
and interconnected ensemble of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, scientific statements, administrative measures, 
and philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions that responds 
to an “urgent need” in a certain historical moment. In other words, an 
apparatus is a historically specific and dispersed system of power that pro-
duces and configures practices toward certain strategic and political ends. 
My use of Foucault’s idea of apparatus enables me to move philosophical 
discussion about disability away from restrictive conceptualizations of it 
as (for instance) a personal characteristic or attribute, a property of given 
individuals, an identity, a difference, or a form of social oppression. In 
addition, my assumption that disability is an apparatus, in Foucault’s sense, 
moves philosophical discussion of disability toward a more comprehensive 
conceptualization of it than the other conceptions of disability provide, a 
conceptualization of disability that is historicist and relativist and, hence, 
culturally sensitive in ways that other conceptions of it are not. As an appa-
ratus, disability is a historically specific aggregate that comprises, consti-
tutes, and is constituted by and through a complex and complicated set of 
discourses, technologies, identities, and practices that emerge from medical 
and scientific research, government policies and administrative decisions, 
academic initiatives, activism, art and literature, mainstream popular cul-
ture, and so on. Although some of the diverse elements of the apparatus 
of disability seem to have different and even conflicting aims, design strat-
egies, and techniques of application, the elements of the apparatus are 
nevertheless co-constitutive and mutually reinforcing.
In other words, to understand disability as an apparatus is to conceive 
of it as a far-reaching and systemic matrix of power that contributes to, 
is inseparable from, and reinforces other apparatuses of historical force 
relations, such as settler colonialism, white supremacy, gender, and class. 
On this understanding, disability is not a metaphysical substrate, a natural, 
biological category, or a characteristic that only certain individuals embody 
or possess, but rather is a historically contingent network of force relations 
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in which everyone is implicated and entangled and in relation to which 
everyone occupies a position. That is, to be disabled or nondisabled is to 
occupy a certain subject position within the productive constraints of the 
apparatus of disability. In the terms of this understanding of disability, there 
are no “people with disabilities” and “able-bodied people”; rather, there are 
“disabled people” and “nondisabled people.” Just as people are variously 
racialized through strategies and mechanisms of the apparatus of race, but 
no one “has” a race or even a certain race and, furthermore, just as people 
are variously sexed through strategies and mechanisms of the apparatus of 
sex, but no one “has” a sex or even a particular sex, so too people are var-
iously disabled or not disabled through the operations of the apparatus of 
disability, but no one “has” a disability or even a given disability. In short, 
disability (like race and sex) is not a nonaccidental attribute, characteristic, 
or property of individuals, not a natural biological kind (see Tremain ;2001, 
2015, 2017a; Haslanger 2000, 2006, 2012; Spencer and Tremain 2017).
The apparatus of disability is expansive and expanding, differentially 
subjecting people to relatively recent forms of power on the basis of con-
structed perceptions and interpretations of (inter alia) bodily structure, 
appearance, style and pace of motility, mode of communication, emotional 
expression, mode of food intake, and cognitive character, all of which phe-
nomena are produced and understood within a culturally and historically 
contingent frame and shaped by place of birth, place of residence, gender, 
education, religion, years lived, and so on. My analysis of the apparatus of 
disability treats these phenomena as the outcomes of contextually specific 
and performative relations of power rather than as transcultural and transh-
istorical objective and determined facts about humans. As I have indicated, 
furthermore, the argument that disability is an apparatus is premised on 
an understanding of the relation between power and causation that runs 
counter to current and emerging work in philosophy of disability and dis-
ability studies. For the conception of disability as an apparatus does not rely 
upon some variation of the assumption that impairment and disability could 
be taken up as politically neutral and value-neutral objects of inquiry were 
it not for disabling practices and policies of exclusion that the ideological 
requirements of power place upon them. This assumption is fundamental 
to the BSM (and most other extant sociopolitical approaches to disability) 
whose proponents argue that impairment is a politically neutral human 
characteristic on which disability, construed as a form of social oppres-
sion, is imposed. With the conception of disability as an apparatus, by 
contrast, no domain of impairment or disability exists apart from relations 
of power. Impairment and disability can never be freed from power, nor, 
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furthermore, can there be a phenomenology that articulates these suppos-
edly prediscursive domains. Power relations are not external to impairment 
and disability and their nexus in the apparatus of disability, but rather are 
integral to this relationship, constituting the knowledge and objects that 
these historical artifacts affect, as well as the artifacts themselves. Modern 
power is productive and diffused throughout society rather than merely 
repressive, operating downward from a central authority or institution.
Insofar as techniques of knowledge are not external to or separate from 
strategies of power, and inasmuch as knowledge-power relations are consti-
tutive of the objects that they affect, my feminist philosophy of disability aims 
to identify and examine “especially dense transfer point[s] for relations of 
power” (Foucault 1978, 98) within philosophy that the apparatus of disability 
has produced, thereby contributing to its expansion and to the constitution 
of its naturalized elements, of which impairment is only one. Within the 
discipline of philosophy, the subfields of bioethics and cognitive science are 
most easily recognizable as domains within which the constitutive effects 
of the apparatus of disability are generated. I want to point out, however, 
that such sites of power can be identified across and throughout the disci-
pline. Notice that Foucault’s insight according to which knowledge-power 
relations are constitutive of the very objects that they are claimed to merely 
represent effectively dissolves the binary distinctions between (for instance) 
description and prescription, fact and value, and form and content. Among 
other things, the insight indicates that any given description is indeed a 
prescription for the formulation of the object (person, practice, or thing) to 
which it is claimed to innocently refer (Foucault 1980b, 1997). In other 
words, knowledge-power relations have not only brought impairment into 
being, but rather have brought it into being as a certain kind of thing, that is, 
as negative, as a natural disadvantage, as a problem to be corrected or recti-
fied. Impairment has been problematized in philosophy, that is, has emerged 
as an area of investigation in philosophy (and elsewhere) only because pro-
ductive relations of power established it as a possible object of inquiry and 
a particular kind of object of a particular kind of inquiry in the first place, 
inquiry that has been possible only because techniques of knowledge and 
discursive practices have been able to invest it as such. In short, various dis-
courses within the discipline and profession of philosophy have contributed 
to the production of impairment and other elements of the apparatus of 
disability through the very inquiry into them in which philosophers engage.
The apparatus of disability and its naturalized foundation, impairment, 
are products and mechanisms of biopower, which, as Foucault pointed out, 
is a form of power that political philosophy has thus far largely ignored. 
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Indeed, the apparatus of disability has been integral, indeed vital, to the strat-
egies of this relatively recent form of power. In the January 11 lecture of his 
1977–78 course at the Collège de France (subsequently published in English 
as Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978), 
Foucault described biopower as “the set of mechanisms through which the 
basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political 
strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from 
the eighteenth century, modern [W]estern societies took on board the funda-
mental biological fact that human beings are a species” (2007, 1). Biopower, 
Foucault wrote, is “what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of 
explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation 
of human life” (1978, 143). Life—its enhancement, amplification, quality, 
duration, continuance, and renewal—has become an urgent economic and 
political concern that government policy and practice addresses to wrest 
management and control of it. Biopower’s management of life has entailed 
the inauguration of a novel set of strategic measurements, including the ratio 
of births to deaths, the rate of fertility in the population, and the rate of 
reproduction, as well as a body of statistical knowledge and administrative 
cataloging of states of health and perceived threats to it. Through biopower, 
human biology has become the object of a political strategy (2007, 1).
5. BIOPOWER AND NORMALIZATION
The consolidation of the modern concept of “normal” legitimized and 
occurred in tandem with the new statistical knowledge and other tech-
niques of population management that stemmed from biopower. As 
François Ewald (1991, 138) explains, the norm enabled biopower, “which 
aims to produce, develop, and order social strength,” to steadily do the 
work that juridical modes of governance, characterized by forcible seizure, 
abduction, or repression, had done in the past. The norm accomplished 
this expansion by enabling discipline to develop from a simple set of con-
straints into a mechanism and by transforming the negative restraints of 
the juridical into the more positive controls of normalization (141). From 
the eighteenth century on, the function of technologies of normalization 
has been to isolate so-called anomalies in the population, which can be 
normalized through the therapeutic and corrective strategies of other, asso-
ciated technologies. Technologies of normalization are not innocuous or 
even benevolent responses to these anomalies in the social body. On the 
contrary, technologies of normalization are instrumental to the systematic 
creation, identification, classification, and control of such anomalies; that 
149FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF DISABILITY
is, they systematically contribute to the constitution of the perception of 
anomalies (such as impairment) and operate as mechanisms through which 
some subjects can be divided from others. Foucault introduced the term 
dividing practices to refer to modes of manipulation that combine a scientific 
discourse with practices of segregation and social exclusion to categorize, 
classify, distribute, and manipulate subjects who are initially drawn from 
a rather undifferentiated mass of people. Through these practices, subjects 
become objectivized as (for instance) mad or sane, sick or healthy, crimi-
nal or law abiding. Through these practices of division, classification, and 
ordering, furthermore, subjects become tied to an identity and come to 
understand themselves scientifically (Foucault 1982, 208).
Foucault regarded normalization as a central—if not the central—mech-
anism of biopower’s management of life, the life of both the individual and 
the species. Biopower can thus be defined as a historically specific combi-
nation of normalization and population management conducted through 
vast networks of production and social control. Beginning in the eighteenth 
century, Foucault noted, the power of the normal has combined with other 
powers such as the law and tradition, imposing new limits upon them. The 
normal, he explained, was established as a principle of coercion through 
the introduction of standardized education; the organization of national 
medical professions and hospital systems that could circulate general norms 
of health; and the standardization of industrial processes and products and 
manufacturing techniques. Normalization thus became one of the great 
instruments of power at the close of the classical age, that is, the power that 
the norm harnessed has been shaped through the disciplines that began 
to emerge at this historical moment (Foucault 1977a, 184). For from the 
end of the eighteenth century, the indicators of social status, privilege, and 
group affiliation have been increasingly supplemented, if not replaced, by a 
range of degrees of normality that simultaneously indicate membership in a 
homogeneous social body (a “population”) and serve to distinguish subjects 
from each other, to classify them, and to rank them in a host of hierarchies.
Foucault, in his writing on punishment (1977a) and his subsequent writ-
ing on the history of sexuality (1978), described how knowledges produced 
about the “normal” case become vehicles for the exercise of disciplinary 
force relations that target certain people. The etymology of the term nor-
mal offers clues to the relation between forms of power and the notion of 
normalcy. Ian Hacking (1990) notes that the first meaning of normal that 
current English dictionaries provide is something like “usual, regular, com-
mon, typical.” This usage, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, became 
current after 1840, with the first citation of “normal, or typical” appearing 
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in 1828. Hacking remarks that the modern sense of the word normal was 
not, however, furnished by education or cloistered study but rather by the 
study of life (1990, 161–62). In an illuminating discussion, Hacking asserts 
that the word normal became indispensable because it provided a way to 
be objective about human beings, especially given the inseparability of the 
notion of normal from its opposite, namely, the pathological. The word nor-
mal, he writes, “uses a power as old as Aristotle to bridge the fact/value dis-
tinction, whispering in your ear that what is normal is also all right” (160). 
Just as the concept of human nature is the hallmark of the Enlightenment, 
he argues, the word normal bears the stamp of the nineteenth century. 
Whereas in the past we sought to discover what human nature is, we now 
concern our selves with investigations that will tell us what is normal (161). 
Although the normal stands “indifferently for what is typical, the unenthu-
siastic objective average, it also stands for what has been, good health, and 
what shall be, our chosen destiny.” “That,” Hacking contends, “is why the 
benign and sterile-sounding word ‘normal’ has become one of the most 
powerful ideological tools of the twentieth century” (169). It is especially 
noteworthy for a feminist genealogical intervention into the problematiza-
tion of disability that the modern usage of the word normal evolved in a 
medical context (165).
Hacking (1990) remarks that in the late 1700s the relation between the 
concepts of the pathological and the normal had been significantly rein-
vented. Disease came to be regarded as an attribute of individual organs 
rather than as a characteristic of the entire body. Pathology, likewise, was 
reconfigured, becoming the study of unhealthy organs rather than the study 
of sick or diseased bodies. Unhealthy organs could be investigated, in part, 
by the chemistry of fluids, such as urine or mucus, that actual living beings 
secreted. The concept of the normal, Hacking notes, came into being as 
the inverse of this concept of pathology: a given state of affairs or process 
of the body was normal if it was not associated with a pathological organ. 
In other words, the normal was secondary to, derivative of, and defined 
by the pathological. F. J. V. Broussais’s principle—that life is a matter 
of excitation of tissue and disease is “irritation” of the tissue of a given 
organ—inverted this relation of entailment between the pathological and 
the normal (82). The pathological became defined as deviation from the 
normal, and all variation became characterized as variation from the nor-
mal state. Pathology was no longer conceived as different in kind from the 
normal, but rather as continuous with it (164). This new understanding of 
the normal and the pathological that emerged in the late 1700s is one, but 
only one, component of what I (2010; 2017a) refer to as “the diagnostic 
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style of reasoning,” a style of reasoning that has enabled the consolidation 
and expansion of biopower. Given the importance of statistical knowledge 
to the operations of biopower, it is not surprising that Broussais—to whom 
Auguste Comte, for one, attributes our modern understanding of the nor-
mal—was connected to the first use of statistical data to evaluate medical 
treatment (Hacking 1990, 81; 2002).
6. NORMALIZATION IN BIOETHICS
The notion of “normal species-typical functioning” that bioethicist Norman 
Daniels and his coauthors Daniel Brock, Allen Buchanan, and Daniel 
Wikler (Buchanan et al. 2000)  have popularized in contemporary main-
stream bioethics is a mechanism of normalization through approximation 
to a conception of normality. The idea of species-typical functioning does 
not, of course, originate from within the field of bioethics itself, but rather 
has been imported into that discourse from the work of philosopher of sci-
ence Christopher Boorse (1977). Ronald Amundson (2005) has pointed out 
that although the use of the word typical in the term typical function seems 
to suggest statistical assessment—that is, what constitutes the common or 
usual function—Boorse intends the notion to imply the normal function of 
members of a species. Boorse claims that the distinction between “normal” 
and “abnormal” function is an empirically grounded implication of bio-
medical science. Normal and abnormal function are distinct natural kinds, 
objective facts of the natural world. Within Boorse’s theory, Amundson 
notes, the notion of normal function carries a double implication. First, 
normal function is statistically common in the species; abnormal function 
is rare. Second, normal function is the most successful or (in Darwinian 
terms) the most fit. The claim is that the more an organism diverges from 
its species average, the worse it will function (Amundson 2005, 105; see 
also Amundson 2000).
Amundson (2005) argues that Boorse’s contribution to this discussion 
in bioethics misrepresents biomedical science. Neither functional unifor-
mity nor the association between statistical typicality and excellence of 
function, Amundson states, is a scientific discovery about the biological 
world. As Amundson explains it, information supplied from a wide num-
ber of biological disciplines suggests that we should expect a wide range of 
functional variation, not a narrow match between functional typicality and 
functional success. He points out, furthermore, that evolutionary biology 
does not imply functional uniformity as an outcome of evolution; rather, 
functional variability is a basic assumption of Darwinian natural selection. 
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Conformity among members of a given species is not implied by the facts 
of developmental biology; rather, developmental plasticity and functional 
adaptation, he writes, suggest that we should expect variation in the func-
tional organization of the bodies of species members, not strict conformity. 
As Amundson puts it, there is so much functional variation among humans 
and the variation is so multidimensional that the belief in an objective cor-
relation between typicality and functional success is scientifically untenable 
(2005, 106–7).
Boorse presented his theory as an empirical claim about biology; never-
theless, it has been used to support normative consequences in the bioethi-
cal writings of Daniels, Brock, Buchanan, and Wikler, among others. These 
normative conclusions imply that disabled people have a lower quality 
of life, by virtue of impairment, and that such lives should be prevented. 
Amundson has argued, to the contrary, that these conclusions and indeed 
this entire discussion in biomedical ethics are biased against disabled people 
and the satisfaction of their civil rights because philosophers have failed to 
come to terms with the political conceptions of disability that the disabled 
people’s movement has developed. Amundson has pointed out, further-
more, that these normative conclusions seem to be contradicted by a wealth 
of empirical data and first-person reports from disabled people who do not 
experience a lower quality of life than nondisabled people or experience a 
better quality of life than nondisabled people (Amundson 2000, 2005).
Given the historicist and relativist commitments that motivate my femi-
nist philosophy of disability, I assume that there is no universal, timeless, 
and objective quality of life that can be analytically separated from the 
contingent circumstances in which people live. The idea that there can be 
a singular, evaluative quantification of “life” is a normalizing instrument of 
biopower that categorizes, ranks, differentiates, and distinguishes subjects 
within a population in order to homogenize—that is, normalize—the pop-
ulation. In other words, the idea of “quality of life,” an idea that bioethicists 
such as Daniels and Brock have promoted, is an individualizing and total-
izing technique of power, a technique that implicates academic bioethics in 
the apparatus of disability to an extent that no other subfield is implicated 
in it, although cognitive science and cognate fields increasingly gain ground 
in this regard. Indeed, I contend that the subfield of bioethics (including 
feminist bioethics and disability bioethics)—as a concerted enterprise—is a 
mechanism of biopower whose increasing institutionalization and legitima-
tion in the university, in the discipline of philosophy, and in public policy 
(among other contexts) consolidate and conceal the fundamental role that 
this field of inquiry plays in biopolitical strategies of normalization and 
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hence the government of populations.2 The subfield of bioethics, I want to 
argue, rationalizes (among other things) the proliferation and use of bio-
technologies such as prenatal testing and screening and, in doing so, bioeth-
ics effectively contributes to the constitution of impairment (among other 
so-called anomalies) through the identification, evaluation, assessment, clas-
sification, and categorization of it, thereby expanding the purview of the 
apparatus of disability and extending its reach. The subfield of bioethics, I 
maintain, is a set of strategic discursive practices that works in the service 
of the mechanism of normalization and the government of conduct to elim-
inate impairments that medical, juridical, and administrative discourses 
claim to discover and manage, while simultaneously enabling these dis-
courses to enlarge the scope of the broad outlines of the category of impair-
ment itself.
Bioethics is generally regarded as the most suitable (if not the only) 
domain in philosophy for critical considerations about disability; however, 
bioethics actually operates as an area of philosophy whose guiding assump-
tions and discursive practices are significant obstacles to (1) acknowledgment 
that the questions—metaphysical, epistemological, political, and ethical—
that the apparatus of disability raises are genuinely philosophical, and (2) 
recognition that disabled philosophers who investigate these questions are 
credible philosophers. Indeed, bioethicists serve as gatekeepers, guarding 
the discipline from the incursion of critical philosophical work on disabil-
ity and shielding the profession from an influx of disabled philosophers. 
Exceptions to this exclusion are of course admissible and even serve to legit-
imize both the subfield of bioethics and the discipline in general, typifying 
the polymorphism of the (neo)liberal governmentality—that is, its capacity 
to persistently engage in a practice of autocritique—from which the subfield 
of bioethics has emerged and enabling philosophy to proceed under the 
guise of political neutrality, objectivity, and disinterest (see Tremain 2017a).
The charge of “slippery-slope” reasoning that many bioethicists direct 
at critics of genetic technologies, physician-assisted suicide, and euthanasia 
is a stark example of the gatekeeping in which bioethicists engage. Many 
bioethicists—some of whom have substantial influence on hiring practices 
2 Some feminist philosophers of disability who aim to change the subfield of bioethics in 
ways that would make it more inclusive of philosophy of disability and less hostile to disabled 
people might feel disheartened by my remarks in this context and urge me to explain what 
course of action they should take. Although I indicate at the outset of this article that I do 
not make normative recommendations in it about how the problematization of disability in 
philosophy should be “resolved,” I do make suggestions elsewhere about the way that critical 
philosophical work on the problematization of disability in philosophy and bioethics in par-
ticular might proceed. For instance, see Tremain (2017b; 2006).
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and publishing (among other things) in philosophy, as well as on public 
policy and public perceptions of their field—maintain that philosophers and 
theorists of disability (and disabled activists) who criticize the production 
of these technologies and practices produce fallacious arguments by using 
“slippery-slope reasoning” to advance their claims; thus, their positions, 
these bioethicists argue, ought not to be taken seriously (for instance, see 
Schüklenk et al. 2011). That is, bioethicists who argue in favor of physi-
cian-assisted suicide, euthanasia, and genetic technologies such as prenatal 
testing and screening imply that although the arguments that philosophers 
and theorists of disability advance to oppose these practices and technol-
ogies are politically motivated, ideological, and unsound, their own argu-
ments in favor of these practices and technologies are disinterested (yet 
compassionate), objective (yet caring), and rigorous (yet flexible and sensi-
tive) (see Tremain 2017a).
My argument, however, is that the critiques of physician-assisted suicide, 
euthanasia, and prenatal and other genetic technologies that bioethicists 
associate with slippery-slope reasoning astutely identify the incremental 
normalization of modern force relations that operates through the incul-
cation and utilization of a relatively recent kind of subjectivity; that is, I 
contend that the charge of slippery-slope reasoning that (many) bioethicists 
direct at critics of physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, and genetic tech-
nologies results from the failure of these bioethicists to recognize that the 
critiques address the nature and operations of force relations under neolib-
eral governmentality, including the production of neoliberal subjects whose 
management and modification of biological life is taken as fundamental 
to selfhood and responsible citizenship (see Pitts-Taylor 2010). A certain 
coalescence and movement of force relations centred on the optimization of 
“life”—namely, biopower—has facilitated the incremental normalization of 
these medical technologies, practices, and the bioethical discourses co-con-
stitutive with them in order to promote the life of a distinctive population 
while ensuring the elimination of others. Consider Foucault’s remarks about 
the three main forms that technologies of government take in their develop-
ment and history: first, a given technology of government takes the form of 
a dream or utopia; next, the dream of the technology of government devel-
ops into actual practices or rules to be used in real institutions; finally, the 
practices and rules of the technology of government become consolidated 
in the form of an academic discipline (Foucault 1988, 145–62; see also 
Hall 2015, 166–69; Hall 2016). I contend that Foucault’s itinerary of the 
advance of a technology of government aptly explains the rise and growth 
of bioethics in the neoliberal university.
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Mainstream bioethicists assume that they should apply the allegedly uni-
versal and ahistorical principles of deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue 
ethics to medical situations, that is, they presuppose that these situations 
are occasions for the expression and application of pre-existing individu-
alistic values such as autonomy, well-being, and liberty. I maintain, how-
ever, that the repeated iteration of these values in research agendas and 
clinical protocols is performative, repeatedly generating and configuring 
them anew (see also Hall 2015, 169; Hall 2016). My argument is that the 
academic discipline of bioethics is an institutionalized vehicle for the bio-
politics of our time, that is, bioethics is a predictable product of biopower, 
a technology of government that provides intellectual resources designed to 
ensure the “strengthening” of a certain population and the eradication of 
others. A neoliberal governmentality of security—in support of which the 
apparatus of disability and other apparatuses have amalgamated—under-
girds the academic field of bioethics and has motivated its emergence and 
elaboration, including the incessant production within the field of questions 
and concerns about putatively natural “disabilities” and the refinement of 
positions that rationalize their prevention and elimination (Tremain 2017a). 
In short, bioethics is a pernicious enterprise, a mechanism of racism against 
the abnormal, as Foucault (2007) referred to it. In a text that is both pre-
scient and provocative, Foucault described racism against the abnormal 
as a racism not preoccupied with attacking members of another race, but 
rather with protecting the boundaries of the race, the only race that matters, 
the human race embodied in its “highest” representatives (see McWhorter 
2009, 139–40). As Foucault remarks about the development of a technol-
ogy of government suggest, bioethics, as a mechanism of racism against the 
abnormal, is the institutionalization of a modern regime of eugenics. Hence, 
the importance of Foucault for a feminist philosophy of disability that aims 
to subvert the individualized and medicalized conception of disability that 
has conditioned claims advanced in philosophy.
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